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I. INTRODUCTION 
Why are convertible securities used in corporate finance? Critics claim that the 
combination of disparate features in these securities makes no more sense than packag-
ing apples and oranges together. 1 Under this view convertibles are a. zero-sum game: 
any benefits to purchasers come at the expense of the issuer, and vice versa. If this is 
so, the use of convertibles must be a mistake for the issuer or the purchaser, or both. 
However, just as bees continued to fly and pitchers still threw curve balls even when 
scientists declared these acts physically impossible, corporations still issue and investors 
still purchase convertible securities despite their alleged uselessness. The persistent use 
of convertibles evidences that they must serve a purpose. 
Some economists believe that convertibles deter issuers from exploiting lenders by 
undertaking high risk projects with negative net present value.2 Others claim that con-
vertibles credibly signal positive information about the issuer, thereby overcoming in-
vestors' fears of false disclosures.3 A third thesis argues that medium quality f"rrms use 
convertibles to avoid both the negative reaction of stock markets to equity financings 
and the risks of bankruptcy created by straight debt.4 The remaining explanation sees 
1. See William A. Klein, The Convertible Bond: A Peculiar Package, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 547, 553 
(1975); see a/so B. GRAHAM ET AL., SECURITY ANALYSIS 601-02 (4th ed. 1962); Wilbur G. Lewellen & 
George A. Racette, Convertible Debt Financing, 8 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 777, 784-86, 791 
(1973) (reflecting the Modigliani-Miller thesis that "the market value of any firm is independent of its capital 
structure"); Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Costs of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the The-
ory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 268 (1958). 
2. See Michael J. Brennan & Eduardo S. Schwartz, The Case for Convertibles, I CONTINENTAL BANK 
1. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55, 59 (1988); Richard C. Green, Investment Incentives, Debt, and Warrants, 13 J. FiN. 
EcON. 115, 115-17 (1984); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Be-
havior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FiN. ECON. 305, 345 (1976); Wayne H. Mikkelson, Con-
vertible Debt and Warrant Financing: A Study of the Agency Cost Motivation and the Wealth Effects of Calls 
of Convertible Securities 19-28 (1980) (unpublished manuscript, on me with the author); Clifford W. Smith, 
Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting, 7 J. FiN. EcoN. 117, 141-42 (1979). 
3. See Michael J. Brennan & Alan Kraus, Efficient Financing Under Asymmetric Information, 42 J. FiN. 
1225, 1237-40 (1987); George M. Constantinides & Bruce D. Grundy, Optima/Investment With Stock Repur-
chase and Financing as Signals, 2 REv. FIN. STUD. 445, 461 (1989); Jeremy C. Stein, Convertible Bonds as 
Backdoor Equity Financing, 32 J. FIN. EcoN. 3, 13-14 (1992). 
4. Stein, supra note 3, at 19. 
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convertibles as discouraging equity holders from prematurely dissolving highly lever-
aged finns.5 
This Article examines these theories and finds them insufficient even for public 
companies, to which they are supposed to apply. They fare worse yet for private firms 
which use convertibles even more frequently. Indeed, no one theory explains all uses of 
convertibles. Convertibles can reduce agency costs by reconciling differences in risk 
aversion and diminishing managers' exploitation of investors, but they can also pro-
mote managers' interests at the expense of shareholders. The mix of factors varies 
from case to case. Thus, the role of convertibles proves complex and diverse. 
After describing convertible securities (part IT) and existing explanations for their 
use (part ill), this Article challenges those explanations for public offerings (part IV), 
and for private placements by both public (part V) and private firms (part VI). Part Vll 
examines the frequent use of convertible preferred stock ignored by prior studies. Part 
Vill discusses some implications of the Article's conclusions for future research on 
capital structure. 
II. CONVERTIBLE SECURITIES 
Convertible securities are a major vehicle for fmancing businesses.6 The typical 
convertible is debt (note, debenture, or bond) or preferred stock t.!Jat can be excha11ged 
by the holder within a stated period for common stock of the issuer.7 The conversion 
ratio is fixed when the convertible is issued.8 A conversion option is valuable to hold-
ers, so convertible debt carries a lower interest rate than straight debt of the same issu-
er.9 Convertibles tend to be used by companies that are sinaller and riskier than those 
that finance with straight debt. 10 
Convertibles are often callable-the issuer may redeem them during a stated period 
at a stated price, which is usually the issue price, plus any accrued, unpaid interest or 
5. See Stewart C. Myers, The Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147, 153-55 
(1975); Jacques A. Schnabel, An Agency-Theoretic Perspective on Participation Clauses in Loan Contracts, 
20 J. Bus. FIN. & Accr. 133, 133-34 (1993). 
6. See Randall S. Billingsley et al., The Choice Among Debt, Equity, and Convertible Bonds, 11 J. FIN. 
REs. 43, 43 (1988) ("[F]rom 1980 to 1985 U.S. furns raised between six percent and ten percent of their total 
long-term funds with convertible debt issues"). 
7. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 294 (5th 
ed. 1993). 
8. The conversion price is usually 10-20% above the market price of the common at the time of issue. 
See Robert M. Soldofsky, The Risk-Return Performance o[Convertibles,J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Winter 1981, 
at 81. 
9. ld. The difference averages about 3%, but varies from case to case. For example, conversion is more 
valuable (so tbe difference in interest rates from straight debt is greater) when the conversion price is closer to 
tbe market price of the common. Likewise, convertible preferred stock commands lower dividends than 
straight preferred. ld. 
10. RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE. 549 (4th ed. 
1991) ("[C]onvertibles tend to be issued by the smaller and more speculative firms"); see also Billingsley et 
al., supra note 6, at 49 (asserting that "smaller [public] firms are more likely to issue either equity or convert-
ibles, whJle large firms tend to issue debt"); Brennan & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 56 ("[C]ompa..-lies issuing 
convertibles tend to be those for which uncertainty about risk is likely to be greatest"). 
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dividends, plus a call premium. 11 Calls must be preceded by notice which enables 
holders to convert to common stock before redemption. 12 When the conversion value 
exceeds the call price, issuers can, and often do, force conversion by giving notice of 
redemption. 13 
Ill. RECEIVED EXPLANATIONS OF CONVERTIBLES 
An inviting justification for convertibles is that they offer investors the best of both 
worlds-the superior protection of a senior security and the opportunity to take common 
stock if its value rises. If convertibles are the best of both worlds for investors, though, 
they must be the worst of both worlds for issuers (or, more precisely, their sharehold-
ers). When an issuer prospers, the investor converts at a bargain price and shares the 
prosperity. Yet, when the firm languishes, the investor keeps the senior security with its 
income and liquidation preferences while shareholders get little or nothing. However, if 
a convertible is priced to reflect these benefits to investors, the advantage to the inves-
tor disappears. 
Can convertibles be efficient-better for not just one side, but for both? Legal 
scholars have ignored this question, but several financial economists have taclded it. 
Some of them advance a "risk incentive" theory: 14 equity holders can exploit holders 
of straight debt (i.e., creditors, including lenders) by talc.ing on risky (i.e., high variance) 
projects wit:~ negative net present value. If the projects ai"1d the fl.\111 fail, creditors bear 
much of the loss. If the projects succeed, however, lenders get only a limited, fixed 
return while equity holders reap most of the gains. Convertibles, it is argued, solve this 
problem by enabling lenders to convert to equity if the projects succeed. 15 By forcing 
shareholders to share the profits from successful projects, convertibles deter issuers 
from undertalcing projects with negative net present value. 
Firms seeking capital must assure investors that negative information about the 
firm has not been withheld. Some economists posit that convertibles bridge the "infor-
11. See Klein & Coffee, supra note 7, at 249; William W. Bratton, Jr., The Economics and Jurispru-
dence of Convertible Bonds, 1984 WIS. L. REv. 667, 678 (call price is "usually fixed at par plus a small pre-
mium"). Calls are often prohibited for some period (often two years) after issue. See id. at 678 n.38. 
12. Notice is required by the federal securities Jaws even if not by contract. See LOUJS LOSS, FUNDA-
MENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 924 (1983). 
13. Wallace N. Davidson III et al., Signaling with Convertible Debt, 30 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANAL-
YSIS 425, 430 (1995) (demonstrating that nearly half of convertible debt issues in study were called); Wayne 
H. Mildcelson, Convertible Calls and Security Returns, 9 J. FIN. EcoN. 237, 239 (1981). 
14. The term is used by Green, supra note 2. The same phenomenon is called "risk shifting" by M. P. 
Narayanan, On the Resolution of Agency Problems by Complex Financial instruments: A Comment, 42 J. FIN. 
1083, 1083 (1987); "wealth transfer" by Robert A. Haugen & Lemma W. Senbet, Resolving the Agency Prob-
lems of External Capital Through Options, 36 J. FIN. 629, 640 (1981); and "asset substitution" by Smith & 
Warner, supra note 2, at 118-19. Shareholders can also increase risk to creditors by "claim dilution"-i.e., 
adding more debt. See Smith & Warner, supra note 2, at 118. 
15. See sources cited supra note 2. Put another way, increases in the issuer's risk reduce the value of the 
debt component by increasing the value of the equity component of convertibles. Brennan & Schwartz, supra 
note 2, at 59; see also VICTOR BRUDNEY & WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE 400 (4th ed. 1993) 
("The more volatile the price of the stock, Lhe higher Lhe value of Lhe call [i.e., option to purchase the 
stock]"). 
1996] The Role of Convertible Securities in Corporate Finance 245 
mation asymmetry" between issuers and investors by giving investors the safety of a 
debt instrument in case the firm's disclosures prove false. Only if the-firm thrives will 
the investors take equity in the firm by converting the debt to common stock. 16 
Jeremy Stein advances a financial distress theory based on pecking order con-
cepts-"good" firms borrow while ''bad" firms issue stock. A "medium" firm fears "the 
negative inference the market would draw": 17 that the firm is "bad" if it issues stock. 
Straight debt is also unattractive because of the costs of fmancial distress, 18 including 
bankruptcy. Therefore, medium firms issue convertibles. 
Several implications flow from Stein's theory. First, managers view convertibles as 
"delayed" or "backdoor" equity, not as "sweetened debt." 19 Second, convertibles are 
"especially valuable for fmns that: 1) are characterized by significant informational 
asymmetries; and 2) might incur large costs of fmancial distress if they added more 
debt to their capital structure."20 Third, issuing convertibles should not injure a compa-
ny's stock price as does issuing equity.21 
In a company with debt, shareholders might liquidate rather than obtain new fi-
nancing, even if the firm has a positive net present value, if returns on new financing 
would be inadequate. This "underinvestrnent" problem22 can arise even though credi-
tors want the firm to continue. An equity feature in the debt (including, but not limited 
to, convertibility) diminishes this problem by reducing the interest on the debt. There-
fore, it is less likely that interest will consume so much income that equity holders will 
liquidate a firm \Vith positive net present value~23 
IV. PUBLIC OFFERINGS OF CONVERTIBLES 
A. The "Risk Incentive" Hypothesis 
The risk incentive theory assumes that "all agents are risk-neutral,"24 but most 
managers are risk-averse. Most shareholders are risk-neutral toward each public compa-
ny because they diversify away risk by holding a broad portfolio of investments. Man-
16. See sources cited supra note 3. 
17. Stein, supra note 3, at 8. For a general discussion of pecking order theories, see Lakshmi Shyam-
Sunder & Stewart C. Myers, Testing Static Trade-Off Against Pecking Order Models of Capital Structure 4 
(1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 
18. See Stein, supra note 3, at 8-9. 
19. Stein finds evidence for this in the attitudes of managers and in the fact that two-thirds of convertible 
bonds issued eventually are converted./d. at 12, 15. But see infra text accompanying notes 49-51. 
20. Stein, supra note 3, at 13-14 (citing empirical evidence); see also Jensen & Meckling, supra note 2, 
at 354. Such firms are known as "highly leveraged firms." 
21. Stein, supra note 3, at 15-17 (including empirical evidence). But see Larry Y. Dann & Wayne H. 
Mikkelson, Convertible Debt Issuance, Capital Structure Change and Financing-Related Information, 13 J. 
FIN. ECON. 157, 184 (1984) ("Significant negative abnormal returns accrue on average to common sharehold-
ers of firms announcing a new public offering of convertible debl"); B. Espen Eckbo, Valuation Effects of 
Corporate Debt Offerings, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 119, 149 (1986) ("Convertible debt offerings have a negative 
impact on the fmn's common stock price."). 
22. See sources cited supra note 5. 
23. See Schnabel, supra note 5, at 135. 
24. Stein, supra note 3, at 5. Others make the same assumption even while recognizing that it skews 
results. See, e.g., Constantinides & Grundy, supra note 3, at 450. 
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agers avoid risk because they cannot diversify their investment of both money and hu-
man capital in the firm.25 High variance projects may increase the stock price of firms 
with debt, but they also raise the risk of bankruptcy. Most public company executives 
own but a tiny share of the firm's stock, so their potential gains from risky projects are 
small. Bankruptcy, however, threatens their compensation, perquisites, discretion, and 
even their jobs. Thus, "the claim that the manager holds on the fmn in the form of his 
wage contract has some of the characteristics of debt."26 His interests may align more 
with the creditors' than with the shareholders'. Tying compensation to share price by 
giving managers stock or stock options does not necessarily cure this problem. It re-
wards success, but fear of personal loss from a falling stock price may increase the risk 
aversion of managers who own a large block of a fmn's stock.27 
Shareholders do not control most public firms; the risk-averse managers do.28 In 
public firms, then, the risk incentive problem is minor, as their call practices show. 
Calls typically occur when "the conversion value of the called debt claims exceeds the 
call price ... [O]n average common stock values fall approximately two percent at the 
announcements of convertible debt calls .... "29 The damage to shareholders may ac-
tually be greater.30 This indicates that managers make calls not to maximize share val-
ue, but to diminish their own risk by reducing debt, which they do as soon as the ex-
pected damage to stock price is small enough to avoid a shareholder revolt.31 If undue 
25. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 M_!CH. 
L. REv. 1, 37 (1986) ("There is a natural incentive ... for managers to limit their debt financing to as low a 
value as is consistent with signalling"); see also Stephen A. Ross, The Determination of Financial Structure: 
The Incentive-Signalling Approach, 8 BELL J. EcoN. 23, 33-35 (1977) (explaining that managers' risk aver-
sion may affect choice of financial structure). 
26. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 2, at 353. 
27. See Coffee, supra note 25, at 18, 24; Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of 
Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv. 857, 869, 875-76 (1983). 
28. In reliance on the managers' risk-aversion, some lenders waived or weakened covenants and suffered 
losses in leveraged buyouts in the 1980s. Still, the use of covenants in public debt offerings continues to de-
cline. See ILEEN B. MALITZ, THE MODERN ROLE OF BOND COVENANTS 43-44 (The Research Foundation of 
the Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts 1993) (indicating that the same is true of private placements); 
Mark Carey et al., The Economics of Private Placements: A New Look, 2 FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS, & 
INSTRUMENTS, Aug. 1993, at 1, 29 (explaining that the decline of covenants may reflect a market glitch. Pub-
lic bond funds seek higher yields to attract investors, even at the expense of more valuable covenants, which 
investors cannot value. Competition then forces purchasers in private placements to waive or weaken cove-
nants, too.). 
29. Mikkelson, supra note 13, at 237, 239. 
30. Stock prices are affected only by unexpected news. If the market expects that management will prob-
ably call convertibles and that the call will reduce share values, share prices will already be diminished to 
reflect that expectation. 
31. Mikkelson recognizes that call practices reflect the managers' own interests, not the shareholders', 
but he does not speculate on how calls benefit managers. Mikkelson, supra note 13, at 243. Calls may also 
have an "information effect" "[l]f managements, in anticipation of difficult times, have a tendency to clear 
the decks of fixed and semi-fixed obligations by forcing conversion, the market would then come to recognize 
forced conversions as unfavorable auguries, and mark down the stock prices accordingly." Brennan & 
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 62. Calls may signal management's intentions as well as its expectations about 
market conditions. Conversion reduces interest payments and thus increases free cash flow. When convertibles 
are called, the market may expect the managers to waste some of this extra cash flow. Cf infra note 60 and 
accompanying text (noting that managers tend to waste free cash flow). 
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risk-taking threatens lenders, convertibility does not significantly alleviate that threat. 
Conversion prices are set at a premium over the issuer's share price at time of issue,32 
so conversion makes sense only if the stock price rises sharply or the value of the debt 
collapses. Managers take high risks only when a fmn is in dire straits. However, at that 
point, the firm's stock price will have fallen and conversion will make no sense, even 
if the value of the debt has also dropped.33 Therefore, making debt convertible does 
not deter extreme risk-taking. 
In fact, most debt is not convertible. Rather, lenders obtain covenants that require 
the borrower to maintain compliance with various fmancial tests and limit asset substi-
tution.34 These tests both limit risk-taking and provide an early tripwire signalling an 
issuer's fmancial distress. If convertibles were employed when an issuer is considered 
likely to undertake undue risk, covenants would be especially stringent in convertible 
fmancings. In practice, however, the opposite is true-covenants tend to be tighter for 
straight debt. 35 
Although managers dislike risk, shareholders of fmns with straight debt have an 
incentive to increase risk. Convertibles may limit this incentive and thereby reduce 
shareholder pressure on managers to increase risk.36 Still, for public fmns excessive 
risk-taking is a minor concern, and convertibility is only a secondary protection against 
that concern. 
A va.ria11t of t.i}e risk i11centive theory asserts that convertibles are issued by fmns 
already viewed as risky.37 Risky fmns face higher interest rates for straight debt than 
safer firms, but convertibility is more valuable for risky fi_rms.38 Thus, a risky fmn 
may be able to issue convertibles at the same interest rate as a safer firm. This benefit 
comes at a price, however. The conversion option is more dilutive of the common stock 
of a risky fmn than it is for a safer fmn. Thus, this variant also fails to identify any 
advantage to shareholders stemming from use of convertibles; the beneficiaries still 
seem to be the managers. 
The risk incentive theory posits that convertibility exists primarily to deter issuers 
from undertaking risky projects with negative net present value. It would follow that 
convertibles are primarily debt. This clashes with the "asymmetric information" and 
"financial distress" theories, which primarily view convertibles as equity.39 It also 
32. See Soldofsky, supra note 8, at 81. 
33. Because creditors are preferred over shareholders in bankruptcy, a fum's stock price drops faster 
than the value of its debt if it approaches bankruptcy. In theory, taking on high-variance projects might in-
crease a firm's share price before the results of the projects are known. However, conversion only makes 
sense when share price rises above the conversion price, which is usually 10-20% above the market price at 
the time of issue. See id. at 82. lf such an increase can be achieved at all, it comes only by assuming far 
greater risk than most risk-adverse managers would even consider. 
34. See Smith & Warner, supra note 2, at 117. Other covenants limit dividends and redemptions. The 
latter are designed primarily for other purposes, but also deter high risk-taking by keeping issuers out of a 
parlous financial condition in which the shareholders might be tempted to take high risks. 
35. See Bratton, supra note I I, at 673. 
36. See Brennan & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 59 (stating that managers may issue convertibles to reduce 
pressure to assume high risk). 
37. /d. at 58-59. 
38. Brudney & Bratton, supra note 15, at 400. 
39. See infra text following note 41, text accompanying note 42. 
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clashes with the tenet of the fmancial distress theory that managers shun straight debt 
because they are risk-averse. 
B. The "Asymmetric Information" Hypothesis 
A second theory is that convertibles bridge an information asymmetry between 
investors and issuers.40 A related thesis is that convertibles "make sense whenever it is 
unusually costly to assess the risk of debt" because of extraordinary uncertainty.41 Un-
der this view, convertibles rea8su.te investors about the issuer's disclosures and stabili-
ty: if information proves false and the issuer falters, the investor retains the seniority of 
debt. The investor's primary interest is in equity, however. Thus, this explanation 
views convertibles primarily as "backdoor equity."42 This makes no sense for the issu-
er. If the issuer is confident its stock price will rise, why give investors a bargain con-
version price? For a fmn plagued by information asymmetries, "it would be even better 
to issue straight debt, retiring it with proceeds of a· stock issue after the stock price has 
risen."43 Nor does the asymmetric information thesis square with the v~ew of convert-
ibles as "sweetened debt." If investors fear deceit and default, convertibility won't help 
because conversion makes sense only if an issuer prospers. The investors would prefer 
straight debt, which carries a higher interest rate and tighter restrictive covenants than 
convertibles. That covenants are less stringent for convertibles44 suggests that informa-
tion asymmetries are not the main concern of investors. 
C. The "Financial Distress" Hypothesis 
Stein posits that "good" fmns borrow but "medium" firms issue convertibles be-
cause they fear financial distress (i.e., bankruptcy). Therefore, medium fmns never 
mimic good fmns. 45 This thesis fails on several grounds. First, it contradicts Stein's 
own assumption that medium firms know "with certainty" that they will be able to force 
conversion by calling the convertibles.46 If a firm "knows" this, the risk of fmancial 
distress must be zero, and the firm is "good" and should borrow. The "certainty" postu-
late also undermines Stein's view of convertibles as "backdoor equity" rather than 
"sweetened debt": if success is assured, why not borrow and refinance more cheaply 
after the firm succeeds?47 
4D. See sources cited supra note 3. 
41. See BREALEY & MYERs, supra note 10, at 549. 
42. See Stein, supra note 3, at 13-14 (stating that convertibles are backdoor equity and are used by firms 
with "significant informational asymmetries"). 
43. Brennan & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 57. The issuer could also refinance with new debt at a lower 
interest rate. The response that the firm does not issue debt because it is too risky for lenders is discussed 
under the "fmancial distress hypothesis." See infra text accompanying notes 46, 4ll-49, and 51-52. 
44. See Bratton, supra note 11, at 673. 
45. Stein, supra note 3, at 8. 
46. Jd. Indeed, Stein later calls the assumption unrealistic. ld. at 10. He also assumes that the call price 
of convertibles is less than the issue price. ld. at 7. This is implausible; investors would not agree to allow 
calls that would cause them to lose money. In fact, calls almost always require payment of a premium. See 
Bratton, supra note II, at 678-79. 
47. See supra text accompanying note 43 (quoting Brennan & Schwartz). 
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Second, many issuers do mimic better firms by disseminating false information, 
even though deception is illegal.48 Indeed, fear of deceit underlies the asymmetric in-
formation hypothesis. With or without deception, many medium firms mimic good 
firms by trying to borrow. The obstacle is the lenders' unwillingness, not the issuers'. 
1bird, the cost of bankruptcl9 to diversified shareholders is modest; much of the cost 
is borne by creditors and managers. Thus, avoidance of this cost does not explain why 
shareholders would prefer convertibles to straight debt. 
Stein's view of convertibles as "backdoor equity" also clashes with the risk incen-
tive theory,50 although the evidence here is mixed. Stein cites evidence that 70% of 
convertibles are converted,51 but other studies show that convertibles are primarily 
debt.52 A more persuasive version of the financial distress theory emerges if we alter 
some of its assumptions. First, issuers of convertibles are not certain that they will be 
able to force conversion; therefore, they face a real threat of bankruptcy. Second, al-
though creditors bear much of the ex post costs of bankruptcy, lenders add the possibili-
ty of these costs to the (risk-free) interest rate they demand. Charging higher interest, 
however, exacerbates the danger of bankruptcy. Convertibility, then, not only adds an 
equity component and thereby lowers the interest rate on the debt component, but also 
reduces the risk of bankruptcy costs that increase the required interest rate. 
However, even this revised thesis does not explain most uses of convertibles. The 
lower interest rate on convertibles is too small to save many fmns from bankruptcy. 
Further, to reduce interest costs, other strategies make more sense than issuing convert-
ibles. A firm can simply forego outside financing/3 issue secured debt, or issue pre-
ferred stock, which cannot trigger bankruptcy. Issuers can also offer stringent restrictive 
covenants. In fact, convertibles carry more lenient covenants than straight debt, which 
shows that lowering the risk of bankruptcy is not a primary reason for using convert-
ibles. In sum, the financial distress theory does not explain the use of convertibles. 
48. E.g., Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1992); SEC Rule lOb-S, 15 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b-5 (1992). 
49. Stein calls these the costs of "financial distress," which indicates that insolvency can arise without 
fonnal bankruptcy proceedings. Stein, supra note 3, at 6. He defines these costs to comprise the "time and 
resources devoted to litigation." Jd. 
50. See supra text accompanying note 39. The "asymmetric infonnation" thesis, however, supports 
Stein's view. See supra text accompanying note 19; see also Davidson et al., supra note 13 (stating that, on 
average, convertible bonds are at-the-money within 1.5 years of issue). 
51. Stein, supra note 3, at 10. 
52. See Randall S. Billingsley et al., Valuation of Primary Issue Convertible Bonds, 9 J. FIN. REs. 251, 
256-57 (1986) (concluding that the average convertible bond at the time of issue is 38% equity and 62% 
debt); see also Randolph P. Beatty et al., On the Nonstationarity of Convertible Bond Betas: Theory and 
Evidence, 28 Q. REv. ECON. & Bus. 15 (1988) (comparing prices and returns of 97 issues of convertibles to 
those of stocks and bonds; 77 exhibited characteristics of debt, 20 exhibited characteristics of equity). 
53. This would not be true when convertibles are used to refmance straight debt, but that use seems to 
be fairly rare. 
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D. The "Underinvestment" Theory 
The underinvestment theorf4 helps to explain the use of convertibles only in spe-
cial circumstances. The lower interest rates on convertible debt encourage an issuer to 
invest by reducing the cost of a project, but convertibility also dilutes the possible re-
turns per share. The net effect of the two opposing influences is probably minimal in 
determining whether a project has positive net present value for incumbent shareholders. 
Further, managers tend not to liquidate profitable firms prematurely, but rather to retain 
their positions by preserving firms that should be dissolved.55 Thus, the 
underinvestment problem is probably significant only where managers oversee many en-
terprises (as often happens with real estate ventures), but have no large personal stalce 
in any one. 
Even when underinvestment is a threat, it can be addressed in other ways. Debt 
securities typically impose prepayment penalties (i.e., call premiumsi6 that discourage 
issuers from paying off debt rather than (re)investing, which eliminates much of the 
difference in interest rates between convertible and straight debt. This indicates that the 
underinvestment theory does little to explain the use of convertibles. 
E. Toward a More Complex Theory of Convertibles 
In sum, no existing theory offers a convincing general explanation for the public 
sale of convertibles. These hypotheses are not wortJ1!ess; each may help explain some 
cases. A comprehensive theory, however, must be more complex and detailed than any 
theory offered so far. 
The managers' risk aversion undermines some theories of convertibles, but gives 
birth to others. Managers' compensation is often tied to firm earnings. Interest charges 
reduce earnings, thus reducing managers' pay. The lower interest rate on convertibles 
benefits managers by boosting earnings. Conversion reduces earnings per share, but 
increases total earnings on which compensation is sometimes based.57 Even if a man-
ager's pay is tied to per-share earnings, conversion occurs only if the firm prospers, 
while the benefit of a lower interest rate is realized if the finn stagnates. In effect, in-
vestors in convertibles assume some of the firm's risk by taldng a lower interest rate 
than straight lenders if the firm falters but a higher return (through conversion) if the 
firm thrives. Risk-averse, nondiversified managers prefer this tradeoff, though risk-neu-
tral shareholders would not. 
Managers' risk aversion helps explain why conve1tibles are used mostly by riskier 
firms. Managers lose much more than (diversified) shareholders or creditors do from 
bankruptcy. Such losses include compensation, perquisites, managerial discretion, and 
even their jobs. Thus, Stein's financial distress theory, though weak from the perspec-
tive of shareholders, is more robust when applied to the managers. Managers' risk 
54. See supra text accompanying note 5. 
55. Cf infra text preceding note 58 (explaining how managers make special efforts to avoid dissolution 
in banlcruptcy). 
56. See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 7, at 677. 
57. See GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, lN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERJCAN EXECU-
TIVES 56 (1992) (providing an example of compensation based on total after-tax profits). 
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aversion also explains why issuers frequently call convertibles even though calls usually 
reduce share prices: managers make calls so as to save interest costs and reduce the 
personally significant threat of bankruptcy. 58 
It follows from the foregoing that the pecking order theory-that stable firms bor-
row, weak fmns issue stock, and medium firms issue convertibles-must be supple-
mented by considering how firmly entrenched the firm's managers are. Those who are 
firmly entrenched are freer to avoid risk than managers who are not. The latter may be 
compelled to accept more debt than they would like, while the former will lean more 
toward equity; those in the middle will issue convertibles.59 
Convertibles also protect their holders, not so much from deceit (as the asymmetric 
information thesis posits) or from excessive risk (as the risk incentive theory claims) as 
from mismanagement. The best way to divide a pie evenly is to have one person slice 
and the other choose his piece. Convertibles exploit this principle. Managers, who con-
trol the day-to-day business, are necessarily the slicers. If investors indicate in advance 
which slice they want-debt or equity-the managers can diminish that slice. If the 
investors choose after the slicing, however, the managers' incentive is to slice the pie 
fairly. 
Managers can be lazy or self-serving. Many pursue fmn growth by reinvesting free 
cash, even when potential returns are low.60 Interest payments on debt reduce free 
cash. IC'1owing how managers fear debt, investors see tlJe use of convertibles not as a 
signal of managers' veracity or caution, as the risk incentive and information asymme-
try theories posit, but as supporting the managers' implied promise to forego waste, 
self-dealing, and sloth and to work hard to induce conversion by raising the firm's 
share price. Purchasers pay a higher price for this implied promise, which offsets the 
dilutive effect of convertibility on stock value. An issuer can achieve the same result by 
issuing straight debt, performing so well that its stock price rises, and then refinancing 
with equity, but the transaction costs of refinancing could exceed the savings from 
cheaper capital. Managers also dislike the higher interest rates on straight debt for rea-
sons already discussed. 
This analysis also explains why new issues of equity impair stock prices61 while 
new issues of convertibles do not62--equity investors see the issuance of convertibles 
58. This accords with the theory that managers make calls when they predict harder times for the firm. 
See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
59. This tendency will be offset somewhat by the effects of the managers' share holdings. Managers who 
own much stock share some of the outside shareholders' receptivity to risk. In most public companies, 
though, the manager-owned portion of stock is too small for this factor to be very significant. 
60. See William J. Baumol et al., Efficiency of Corporate Investments: Reply, 55 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 
128, 128-31 (1973) (stating that returns on reinvested earnings tend to be low); William J. Baumol et al., 
Earnings Retention, New Capital and the Growth of the Firm, 52 REV. ECON. & STAT. 345,354 (1970) (stat-
ing that during 1948-59, returns on retained earnings for U.S. firms averaged between 3% and 4.6%; for firms 
that issued little new equity, returns approached zero); Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, 
Corporate Finance and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 328 (1986) (stating that returns on reinvested 
earnings tend to be low). 
61. See Brennan & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 56. 
62. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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as a signal that managers will not waste free cash flow, but expect to succeed in in-
creasing share price. Issuing common stock sends a contrap; signal. 
Convertibles also tap small niches in the capital markets. Margin requirements are 
more liberal for convertibles than for equity,63 so investors can borrow more while still 
purchasing equity-like securities. Convertibles are safer than straight equity but riskier 
than straight debt. This may appeal to some investors.64 There may also be inefficien-
cies in the trading of convertibles that sophisticated investors can exploit.65 
"How do shareholders gain from the use of convertibles?" may be the wrong ques-
tion for financial economists to ask. Managers prefer convertibles to straight debt be-
cause they are risk-averse, so we need only ask: Do shareholders lose from the use of 
convertibles? A negative answer to that question is plausible.66 If shareholders are 
mostly indifferent, managers will use convertibles as better suited than debt to their own 
purposes. 
The conclusions here show that formal economic analysis alone cannot explain the 
use of convertibles. First, many factors influence the use of convertibles. A formal theo-
ry would have to weight each factor precisely, a hopelessly complex task. Some factors, 
such as the managers' risk -aversion and the strength of non-officer shareholders, cannot 
be gauged by outsiders. Further, the use of convertibles involves many questions be-
yond the decision whether to issue convertibles, such as conversion ratios, restrictive 
covenants, and call premiums. Thus, the use of convertibles is too complex to be ex-
plained by any single formula. Once this complexity is recognized, however, we can 
work toward an explanation that is more thorough and realistic, albeit less simple and 
elegant, than existing theories. 
V. PRIVATE PLACEMENTS OF CONVERTIBLES BY PUBLIC COMPANIES 
Some public companies eschew public offerings and sell convertibles in private 
placements to one or a few financial institutions. Public offerings carry lower interest 
rates67 but have higher transaction costs68 and are possible only for large, stable issu-
ers.69 These higher costs, rarely prohibitive for large issues, can be crucial for smaller 
63. For example, under the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation T, which regulates the extension of 
credit by broker-dealers, the margin for publicly traded stocks may not be Jess than 50%, but the margin for 
bonds (including convertibles) that meet certain criteria is set by the private exchange where the trade occurs. 
12 C.F.R. §§ 220.2(q), (t), 220.18(a), (b) (1988). 
64. Risk can be mitigated in better ways, such as investing in a diversified mutual fund, but some inves-
tors may prefer to create their own portfolios and invest in convertibles. 
65. See William K. S. Wang, Some Arguments That the Stock Market is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 341, 386 (1986) ("[C]onvertibles often sell at approximately conversion value even though the convert-
ible is significantly superior to the common into which it is convertible. In an efficient market, such 
mispricing should not occur."). 
66. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (stating that the announcement of an issue of convertibles 
has little effect on share prices). 
67. See Carey et al., supra note 28, at 9, 24. This reflects "both the greater liquidity of public bonds and 
the smaller costs of credit analysis (i.e., information production) that public lenders bear." /d. at 9. 
68. See Jeffrey A. Timmons & Dale A. Sander, Everything You (Don't) Want to Know About Raising 
Capital, HARv. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 70, 71 (stating that costs "can run 15% to 20% of a smaller 
[public] offering and can go as high as 35% in some instances"). 
69. See Carey et al., supra note 28, at 3 (explaining that "[o]nly well-known, large corporations with few 
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offerings. Thus, both the issuer and the offering tend to be smaller for private place-
ments than for public offerings of securities of any type, including convertibles.70 Most 
studies of convertibles analyze public offerings because the authors are financial econo-
mists who test hypotheses against price movements in public securities markets. Their 
findings may not be valid for private placements. For example, conversion is rarer for 
convertibles sold privately.71 This suggests that convertibles, which are often viewed as 
"backdoor equity" when sold publicly, are usually not so viewed in private placements 
by public companies. Why? 
The asymmetric information thesis is even less persuasive here than for public 
offerings. Purchasers in private placements are sophisticated and usually specialized 
finanCial firms skilled at both analyzing public information about the issuer and person-
ally investigating the issuer to uncover any hidden problems.72 The size of the pur-
chase is also relevant. A private purchase of securities worth tens of millions of dollars 
merits a deeper inspection than does the typically smaller purchase by each buyer in a 
public offering. 
Several factors make these convertibles more "sweetened debt" than "backdoor 
equity." First, managers of the smaller companies that make private placements tend to 
own a larger fraction of the issuer's stock than do managers of the larger firms that 
make public offerings. Small firm managers are, therefore, warier of the dilutive effect 
of convertibles on stock prices. They also care more than managers of larger firms 
about the tax. benefits of debt to issuers.73 Second, private placements employ stricter 
covenants because amendments can be easily negotiated if a covenant becomes more of 
a burden to the firm than a benefit to the investor.74 Protected by these tighter cove-
information problems have access to the public debt market"). 
70. See id. at 7. (reporting that the leading study found a median of $32 million for private placements 
of straight debt (1989) and $150 million for public offerings). The median size of private placement issuers 
was $500 million in total assets, while the median for public issuers was $1.5 billion. !d. at 17. Thus, private 
placements are both smaller and provide less of the issuer's capitalization than public offerings do-the 
median private placement is 6.4% of the issuer's total assets, while the median public offering is I 0% of 
total assets. On the other hand, the ratio of debt to assets is slightly higher and the interest coverage ratio 
slightly lower for issuers of private placements than for public issuers. !d. 
71. The conversion premium is smaller for public deals (about 10%) than for private placements (30-
40%). Memorandum from James Schelling, CIGNA, Inc., to the author (Sept. 5, 1994) (on file with the au-
thor). Accordingly, conversion is rarer in private placements. Moreover, investors rarely convert privately 
placed convertibles and hold the stock. Instead, the conversion option is cashed out by the issuer paying the 
investor the difference between the conversion price and the value of the stock. See id. 
72. See Carey et al., supra note 28, at 23 (reporting that 20 insurance companies purchase 56% of pri-
vately placed debt). Purchasers investigate the issuer beforehand and monitor the issuer after purchasing. /d. at 
3; see also MARCEL KAHAN & BRUCE TUCKMAN, PRIVATE VS. PuBt.IC LENDING: EVIDENCE FROM COVE-
NANTS 1-2, 17-20 {1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (private debt agreements require 
and facilitate more monitoring). This scrutiny outweighs any increase in information asymmetries arising from 
the exemption of private placements from review by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Securities Act 
of 1933, § 4(2), IS U.S.C. § 77d(2) {1992). 
73. Interest on debt is deductible for federal income tax purposes. I.R.C. § 163 (1988). Dividends on 
stock are not. 
74. See Edward Zinbarg, The Private Placement Loan Agreement, 31 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 33, 35 (1975) 
("In any given year, we will, on average, receive one modification request per loan on the books. In no more 
than five per cent of these cases will we refuse the request or even require any quid pro quo .... ") (emphasis 
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nants, private purchasers need not rely so heavily on convertibility. Third, the insurance 
companies that purchase many privately placed convertibles have long-term liabilities to 
provide for and are therefore not as impatient to convert as many public investors.75 
Conversion also poses a greater threat to the managers' control in a private place-
ment than in a public offering. Conversion of a public issue can strengthen the manag-
ers' control by scattering the firm's stock more widely and diluting the power of large 
shareholders. Conversion of a private issue by a single institution, conversely, adds a 
powerful new shareholder who might constrain management. For all of these reasons, 
conversion ratios are higher and conversion is rarer in private placements. 
Why, then, don't these firms issue straight debt? The combination of securities in 
any public offering of convertibles will appeal to some investors but not others.76 In a 
private placement, however, a purchaser negotiates for the precise combination of cove-
nants, interest rate, and conversion rate it wants. Most of these purchasers are fmancial 
institutions whose equity investments are limited by- law.77 As quasi-equity, convert-
ibles may offer higher returns without counting against these limits. Issuers may con-
cede these higher returns because transaction costs are lower for private placements. 
The financial distress theory is more applicable to private than public offerings. 
The lower interest rate on convertibles reduces an issuer's risk of bankruptcy. The 
difference is usually too small to warrant use of convertibles by a large fmn,78 but for 
ihe smaller, riskier, public f1rms that make private placements, t.~e difference may be 
decisive.79 On the other hand, lower interest rates are a tradeoff for convertibility, and 
conversion is rarer in private than in public offerings, so the benefit of lower rates for 
convertibles may not be that great.80 
Since managers of issuers in private placements own a larger share of stock than 
do managers in public issues, they have more incentive to take risks at the expense of 
creditors. This suggests that the risk incentive theory is more valid for private than for 
public issues of convertibles. However, even in smaller public companies, managers 
avoid high variance projects to preserve their jobs. Moreover, the tighter covenants used 
in private placements limit risk-taking.81 In private as in public offerings,82 convert-
in original); see also Malitz, supra note 28, at 10 n.8 (stating that "privately placed debt is more restrictive 
than public issues"). 
75. See Memorandum from James Schelling, supra note 71; see also KAHAN & TUCKMAN, supra note 
72, at 23, 27 (call protection is greater in private debt agreements in order to accommodate the asset-liability 
management needs of lenders). 
76. See Klein, supra note I, at 553. 
77. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 3907.14 (Baldwin 1995). 
78. See supra text preceding note 53. 
79. Convertibility is more valuable in risky than in stable firms. See supra text accompanying note 38. 
80. See Memorandum from James Schelling, supra note 71. Because call premiums are smaller for pub-
lic deals, the interest rate discounts are larger than in private placements. See id. 
81. See Malitz, supra note 28, at 10 n.8 ("[P]rivately placed debt is more restrictive than public issues"). 
Covenants are expensive to draft yet imperfect because risk cannot be defined precisely; it must be attacked 
indirectly. See Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW. 413, 428-29 
(1986). Thus, covenants may block a promising project, but permit an unsound project. See Henry Hansmann 
& Reinier Kraakman, Hands-Tying Contracts: Book Publishing, Venture Capital Financing, and Secured 
Debt, 8 J.L ECON. & 0RGAN1ZAT!ON 628, 649 (!992); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 2, at 338. Covenants 
also curb risk by forbidding an issuer to change its main business, to sell major assets, or to merge. See Smith 
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ibles do little to solve any lingering risk incentive problem. In short, the risk incentive 
theory seems no more valid for private than for public offerings. 
VI. CONVERTIDLE DEBT IN PRIVATE COMPANIES 
A. The Different Role of Convertibles in Private Companies 
Private firms rely more heavily on convertibles and use them for different reasons 
than do public f1rn1s. 83 Private f1rn1s are not publicly traded, so their motive for issuing 
convertibles is not to avoid "the negative inference the market would draw" from issu-
ing equity.84 Many public issuers of convertibles are highly leveraged and use calls to 
force conversion;85 private issuers of convertibles often have little debt and rarely use 
calls.86 Many private firms issue convertible preferred stock; few public frrms do. In-
vestors also view convertibles of private firms differently, if only because there is no 
market for their stock if the purchaser converts. In sum, private companies use convert-
ibles very differently than do public firms. 
The rest of part V considers why private companies use convertible debt rather 
than straight debt or straight equity. Part VI discusses the use of convertible preferred 
stock. 
B. Convertibles vs. Straight Debt 
Debt is usually cheaper (i.e., commands lower returns) than equity because debt is 
safer for investors.87 Interest on debt is also deductible for the issuer's federal income 
tax; dividends on stock are not.88 Thus shareholders generally favor debt over equity 
financing. Managers of private frrms own more of their companies' equity than do 
public frrm managers, so they, too, may prefer debt. Issues of debt also constrain the 
managers' control less than issues of stock.89 Why, then, do private companies issue 
convertibles rather than straight debt? 
& Warner, supra note 2, at 125-31. Lenders monitor an issuer's compliance with covenants, which is costly. 
Monitoring costs are foreseen by the lender and reflected in pricing the debt, so that ultimately the costs are 
borne by the shareholders. See Myers, supra note 5, at I 61. This encourages issuers to agree to covenants that 
limit monitoring costs by limiting risk-taking. 
82. See supra text accompanying notes 24-39. 
83. This reflects the heavier use of convertibles by smaller fmns, see supra note 10, which are more 
likely to be private, and the higher level of inside ownership in private firms. See Michael Frierman & P.V. 
Viswanath, Agency Problems of Debt, Convertible Securities, and Deviations from Absolute Priority in Bank-
ruptcy, 31 J.L. & ECON. 455, 456-57 (1994). 
84. Stein, supra note 3, at 8. 
85. See supra text accompanying note 13. 
86. Call protection is greater for privately than for publicly placed bonds. Carey et al., supra note 28, at 
6, 24. 
87. If the expected returns from the business exceed the interest on debt, debt will be cheaper than equi-
ty. See RICHARD A. BOOTH, FINANCING THE CORPORATION§ 2:05, at 14 (1993). 
88. I.R.C. § 163 (1988). 
89. See supra text following note 74. 
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I. Risk Incentives, Information Asymmetries, and Waste 
Managers of private firms own considerable equity and, thus, might be attracted to 
high variance projects, as the risk incentive theory posits. Even for private firms, how-
ever, the theory is flawed; private firm managers are still more cautious than outside 
shareholders. As with private placements by public fmns, 90 tight restrictive covenants 
curb risk-taking. Lenders to a private fum often require its managers to guaranty the 
debt,91 which discourages managers from high variance projects. Given all these fac-
tors, convertibility plays a minor role in deterring excessive risk-taking by the issuer.92 
The discipline convertibles impose on managerial diligence and use of cash flow93 
is not significant for private fmns, which rarely have much free cash flow and whose 
managers have less incentive to waste assets or be slothful because they own substantial 
blocks of stock. The asymmetric information theory seeks to explain why convertibles 
are used instead of equity, not in lieu of straight debt. 
2. Financial Distress, Risk Adjustment, and Control- .· 
Stein's thesis that fums issue convertibles in response to fear of bankruptcy is 
weak for public firms,94 but may be more valid for private firms. Issues of convertibles 
tend to be smaller for private than for public companies, but they generally constitute a 
larger portion of the private fmn' s capital, so the higher cost of straight debt weighs 
more heavily on private fmns. The cash flow needed to pay interest is less predictable 
for private firms. Many small companies expand rapidly and need all the cash they can 
get for growth. Even if a company can pay high interest, doing so may stunt its 
growth.95 
Although risky fmns face high interest rates on loans, the value of convertibility 
for risky firms is higher,96 so the difference in interest rates between straight and con-
vertible debt is larger for them than for more stable public fmns. The impact of this 
difference on managers' compensation97 makes convertibles attractive to private fmns. 
The higher interest rate on straight debt could also be illegal as usury. Simply foregoing 
90. See Malitz, supra note 28, at 10 n.8 ("[P]rivately placed debt is more restrictive than public issues"). 
91. See 2 ROBERT J. HAFT, VENTURE CAPITAL AND SMALL BUSINESS F'INANCINGS § 2B.04[3], at 2B-33 
(rev. ed. 1992). Many private debt agreements also restrict self-dealing by the issuer's managers. Such restric-
tions are rare in public debt offerings. See KAHAN & TUCKMAN, supra note 72, at 10. 
92. Holders of convertibles of private fmns also often participate in control, and in such cases the re-
strictive covenants are generally less stringent. See infra text accompanying notes 98-99. To some extent this 
practice supports the risk-incentive theory-the covenants are looser than the covenants for straight debt be-
cause convertibility discourages holders of straight equity from undertaking high variance projects. However, 
the right of holders of convertibles to participate in control indicates that their interests do not coincide com-
pletely with the other shareholders'. Attitude toward risk is one area in which their interests may diverge. 
93. See supra text accompanying note 60. 
94. See supra text accompanying notes 45-53. 
95. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 10, at 549; Clifford G. Holderness & Dennis P. Sheehan, Moni-
toring an Owner, 30 J. FIN. EcoN. 325, 329 (1991) (explaining that "[o]perating cash flows, even when they 
were positive, were insufficient to finance [Turner Broadcasting System's] rapid growth"). 
96. See BRUDNEY & BRATTON, supra note 38, at 400. 
97. See supra text accompanying note 57. 
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outside financing is an option for most public firms, but not for the many private firms 
which must grow to survive. 
Finally, purchasers of convertibles from private firms often guard against manageri-
al opportunism by participating in control of the firm by electing directors.98 Some 
investors obtain "event-of-election" or "voting switch" clauses that give them control if 
the issuer defaults or fails to meet agreed fmancial tests.99 Holders of straight debt 
rarely vote because their interests clash so sharply with the shareholders'. Instead, 
holders of debt rely on restrictive covenants. However, tight covenants can thwart prof-
itable projects. Holders of convertibles who have an equity interest and a voice in con-
trol can accept less stringent covenants that are less likely to bar promising ventures. In 
sum, convertibles may make more sense than straight debt in private firms because they 
better align the interests of the managers and investors. 
C. Convertibles vs. Straight Equity 
1. Comparison With Initial Public Offerings 
If straight debt is not feasible, most private frrms prefer to finance by "going pub-
lic." Managers favor an initial public offering (IPO) over a private sale of stock because 
an IPO infringes less on the managers' control,100 bri..ngs a bigher price for t."le stock, 
and creates a market for the managers' own shares. 101 However, private sales to insti-
tutional investors are often possible when IPOs are not because institutions are superior 
monitors. The public cannot adequately investigate an unseasoned company before in-
vesting or observe the company's progress and participate in its control after investing. 
However, institutional investors can. 102 
Why are IPOs made with common stock while private placements commonly use 
convertibles? Several factors are relevant, including the difficulties of using restrictive 
covenants and special voting arrangements in public issues and the desire of existing 
shareholders to create a market for their own stock. Also, public investors buy convert-
ibles only if there is an existing market where the issuer's stock can be sold after con-
version. Public offerings of convertibles do not create such a market. 
2. "Backdoor Equity" or "Sweetened Debt"? 
To reduce interest costs, private frrms make conversion attractive. Therefore, both 
sides usually view convertibles of small firms as essentially equity. The frequent use of 
preferred stock rather than debt as the convertible senior security supports this view. 
98. See 2 HAFT, supra note 91, § 2B.05[I][C], at 2B-94. 
99. See I MICHAEL J. HALLORAN ET AL., VENTURE CAPITAL AND PUBLIC OFFERING NEGOTIATION 359 
(1991). 
I 00. In an !PO, shares are scattered among many purchasers; in a private placement, they are concentrated 
in one potentially powerful (and generally sophisticated) investor. 
101. See William J. Torpey & Jerry A. Viscione, Mezzanine Money for Smaller Businesses, HARv. Bus. 
REV., May-June 1987, at 116, 116-17. 
I 02. This confirms the intuition of Jensen and Meckling that "monitoring activities . . . become special-
ized to those institutions and individuals who possess comparative advantages in these activities." Jensen & 
Meckling, supra note 2, at 354. 
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Even when convertible debt is used, it is often expressly subordinated to other debt 
which reduces the value of the debt component and accentuates the equity component. 
This importance is often underscored by giving the holders voting rights as if the secu-
rities were already converted. 103 
3. Financial Distress, Risk Incentives, and Information Asymmetries 
The risk incentive and financial distress theories attempt to explain why debt is 
made convertible, not why convertibles are used instead of equity. The asymmetric 
information theory may help answer the latter question. In one respect, the information 
asymmetry problem is greater in private than in public firms. As major shareholders, 
managers suffer dilution if the finn sells stock cheaply. Therefore, they may be tempted 
to lie to raise the price at which the stock is sold. 104 Convertibles protect investors 
from deceit: if stock proves less valuable than the issuer represented, the investors keep 
the senior security and the shareholders bear the loss. 
As with private placements by public issuers, however, careful investigation by a 
sophisticated purchaser deters such deception. 105 In addition, purchasers often require 
the issuer's managers to verify disclosures or even to guaranty the debt. 106 This also 
discourages deception. Thus, the debt component of convertibles is not the only protec-
tion against deceit. Moreover, other factors are more important in dictating the use of 
convertibles rather than straight equity. 
4. Opportunism and Divergent Expectations 
Managers can exploit other shareholders as well as creditors. They can take exorbi-
tant compensation, waste cash flow, or indulge in self-dealing. Restrictive covenants do 
not solve the problem. Covenants are rare in issues of straight equity, and some kinds 
of opportunism, such as sloth, are hard to stop or even to detect except by expensive 
monitoring. Unlike creditors, shareholders can vote, but most lack board representation. 
Even investors with board representation stay out of operational details, where most 
mismanagement occurs. 107 Convertibles protect investors from the damage marwgerial 
misconduct does to shareholders-the investor simply keeps the senior security .108 
Managers a..1d investors may disagree about a fL.rru's prospects. 109 Suppose they 
103. See 2 HAFT, supra note 91, § 2B.05[l][C], at 2B-94. 
104. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 2, at 334. It follows that Stein's conclusion that bad and medi-
um firms do not mimic good firms, see supra text accompanying note 45, is even less valid for private than 
for public firms. 
105. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
106. See 2 HAFT, supra note 91, § 2B.04[3], at 2B-33. 
107. Intruding in operations breeds conflict with managers and can eJlpose investors to liability as control-
ling persons for the debts of the issuer under the federal securities laws, see THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF 
SECURITIES REGULATION § 7.7 (2d ed. 1990), or under the corporate law doctrine of piercing the corporate 
veil, see ROBERT C. CLARK, CoRPORATE LAW§ 2.4 (1986). Also, even sophlsticated institutions have a limit-
ed capacity for detailed monitoring. 
108. See supra text follo\ving note 59. 
109. See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL & LEWJS D. SOLOMON, CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE 443 
(1992). 
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agree on what the firm will be worth if it develops a new widget, that it will go bank-
rupt if it fails to develop the widget, and what its assets will be worth if it goes bank-
rupt. However, they disagree on the probability of failure; the managers gauge it at 
10%, the investors at 30%. Convertibles can resolve their disagreement. Both groups 
prefer this to straight equity because investors value the senior security more than man-
agers do. 110 This kind of disagreement is undoubtedly common; managers tend to be 
optimistic about their ventures. 111 
Convertibles also protect managers from opportunism by investors. Investors who 
hold straight equity need more control, which they can abuse by firing the managers or 
cutting their compensation or perquisites. Such action can result either from the inves-
tors' bad faith 112 or from an honest mistake about the managers' worth. Managers 
also resist firings or pay cuts that are in a sense proper-as when the finn finds some-
one who can do the job better. Agents, including managers, often accept lower pay in 
return for protection against removal for reasons other than misconduct or incompe-
tence. Investors can also exploit managers indirectly, such as by selling the firm to a 
buyer who fues the managers. !13 The senior security in a convertible protects investors 
without allowing them what managers would consider excessive interference in running 
the firm. 
Managers can obtain job security by contract, but drafting and enforcing such con-
tracts is costly. Using convertibles is cheaper. Convertibles of private firms are typically 
converted only when the entire company is sold or goes public. Once a firm is public, 
the shareholders face a collective action problem that hinders them from exploiting 
managers. 
5. Avoiding Limbo and Assuring Liquidity 
Some firms neither flourish nor fail, but limp along in what is sometimes called 
Iimbo. 114 If a firm pays managers more than they can earn elsewhere, managers will 
continue the business even though liquidation would benefit the shareholders. If the 
II 0. Assume there is agreement that, if the new widget succeeds, the finn will be worth $100; if it does 
not, the fmn's liquidation value will be $20. The manager, then, values the fmn at $92; the investor values 
it at $76. A bond entitled to the fmn's entire liquidation value in bankruptcy and convertible into 50% of its 
stock would be valued by the investor at $41 (1!2 of 70% of $100 = $35, plus 30% of $20 = $6). To get 
equal value from straight equity the investor would demand about 54% of the stock (54% of $76 = $41.04). 
The manager, however, values the convertible at $47 (1/2 of 90% of $100 = $45, plus 10% of $20), and 
values 54% of the stock in an equity-only structure at nearly $50 (54% of $92 = $49.68). Thus, both are 
happier if the investor takes the convertible. 
Ill. The problem can also be avoided by issuing straight debt, but debt runs counter to the managers' 
risk-aversion and creates cash flow problems. See supra text preceding note 90, following note 94. 
112. A manager may be worth much more to her present firm than to any other. In addition, finding 
another job may require high search costs. Employment agreements requiring officers who quit to surrender 
their stock at less than fair market value further deter them from leaving. If investors control the fmn, they 
can exploit these conditions by paying officers less than the officers' value to the firm. 
113. Investors may also liquidate a fmn to withdraw their investment after the managers have incurred the 
sunk costs of their (undercompensated) efforts. Denying the investors control prevents what may be an ineffi-
cient withdrawal. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 81, at 646-47. 
114. See George W. Dent, Jr., Venture Capital and the Future a/Corporate Finance, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1029, 1046 (1992). 
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company will never pay dividends, go public, or be sold, its stock is basically worth-
less. Indeed, for outside investors limbo is worse than banlrruptcy; if a company fails, 
investors can at least recognize a tax loss on their investrnent. 115 Managers should 
bear the loss if limbo sterns from their misconduct. Limbo can also result from market 
conditions. Since managers should be able to foresee bad market conditions better than 
investors can, investors may reasonably insist that managers bear most of the loss in 
that case as well. 
Limbo is less of a problem in public firms; inadequate managers can be ousted by 
the board, in a proxy fight, or by a tender offer. These are rarely possible in a private 
company. The stock market also gives liquidity for the stock of public companies. In 
private firms, which lack this market, convertible debt provides liquidity through pay-
ments of interest and of principal at maturit-y. These payments also discipline managers 
by requiring them to devote some cash flow to investors, not just to their own compen-
sation. 
D. Why Not a Combination of Debt and Equity? 
Some functions of convertibles could be served by a combination of straight debt 
and straight equity, 116 but using convertibles is superior in several ways. First, a con-
vertible financing requires only one set of negotiations, often with an investor who 
already knows the firm, rather than two sets of negotiations, at least one probably being 
conducted with a stranger to the firm. 117 Transaction costs multiply if the two deals 
must be coordinated. 118 For instance, the interest rate on debt may depend on issuing 
more equity, but the terms of the equity may depend on how much the company bor-
rows.119 Lenders want tight restrictive covenants, but equity investors oppose them. 
Tight covenants are less important for a single issue of a convertible debt. 
Second, many unseasoned companies are too risky to obtain straight debt even if 
they simultaneously issue more equity. 120 They can borrow, if at all, only with con-
vertible debt. Third, borrowing can violate existing covenants that limit the issuer's 
incurrence of debt even if the issuer simultaneously issues more equity. Convertibles are 
often subordinated to existing debt and therefore may not violate these covena;1ts. Final-
ly, with a combination of straight debt and straight equity, the holders of the straight 
debt would encounter the risk-incentive problem while equity purchasers might face the 
asymmetric information problem. These concerns alone may not justify the use of con-
vertibles, but they add to the other concerns supporting their use. 
Of course, many firms do issue both straight debt and straight equity, with or with-
out the additional use of convertibles. Again, no simple predictive formula is possible 
because a firm's choice depends on several factors. 
115. See id. at 1046 n.71; see also I.R.C. § 165(a) (1988) (permitting a deduction for "any loss sus-
tained"). 
I l 6. See BOOTH, supra note 87, § 2:19, at 55 (citing Arthur Fleischer, Jr. & William L Cary, The Taxa-
tion of Convertible Bonds and Stock, 74 HARV. L. REV. 473 (1961)). 
117. See Dent, supra note 114, at 1042 n.51. 
! !8. See id. 
119. See id. 
120. See supra text accompanying note 48. 
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E. Conclusion 
The benefits of convertibles are greater for private companies than public compa-
nies. Therefore, it is not surprising that private firms make more extensive use of con-
vertibles. 
Vll. CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED STOCK 
Why is convertible preferred stock often used by private companies but almost 
never by public companies? 
A. Convertible Preferred vs. Convertible Debt 
Debt has some advantages over preferred stock. Payment of interest on debt is an 
enforceable legal duty; preferred stock dividends can be skipped indefinitely. Holders of 
debt securities share pro rata with other creditors (including trade creditors and tort 
claimants) in bankruptcy; preferred shareholders are junior to creditors. Interest on debt 
is also deductible for federal income tax purposes; preferred stock dividends are 
not.'2' 
For unseasoned companies, however, preferred stock may be superior. Bankruptcy 
courts can subordinate convertible debt to other claims, especially if the holders partici-
pate in control of the firm, as they often do. 122 Even the lower interest payments on 
convertible debt would cripple many small firms. Dividends on preferred stock can be 
skipped indefinitely or conditioned on the firm's meeting certain goals, thereby con-
serving needed cash. 123 The protections investors forfeit by taking preferred instead of 
debt can be offset by the greater control in firm decision-making available to preferred 
shareholders. 
Debt and equity fmancings are not mutually exclusive. Small firms often borrow, 
but a loan may be conditioned on the issuer's selling more stock. Preferred stock meets 
this condition. Many lenders also limit the firm's ability to assume more debt. Pre-
ferred stock does not count against debt lirnits.124 Thus, convertible preferred stock fa-
cilitates further borrowing while debt, even if convertible, hinders it. 
Tax factors may also entice unseasoned issuers to favor preferred over debt. De-
ductibility of interest is of no immediate benefit if a fmn is not a taxable entity 125 or 
is not yet profitable. At best, use of the deduction must wait until profits start to flow. 
121. I.R.C. § 163 (1976). 
I22. II U.S.C. § 510 (1988); see also Holderness & Sheehan, supra note 95, at 339 (stating that preferred 
stock is used in part to avoid danger of subordination). 
123. Dividends can be mandated if the issuer's earnings reach certain levels. This avoids burdens on the 
issuer if business falters, but requires dividends if business thrives. See BOOTH, supra note 87, § 2: I4, at 4I-
42. The same condition can be attached to payment of interest on debt, but the debt might then be treated as 
stock for tax and bankruptcy purposes. See Holderness & Sheehan, supra note 95, at 327; I.R.C. §§ 385, 1001 
(1988). 
I24. The same purpose can be achieved with subordinated debt. See BOOTH, supra note 87, § 3:02, at 3. 
However, even subordinated debt requires interest payments, which may worry other creditors. 
I25. Many fmns with 35 or fewer shareholders elect to be S Corporations, which pay no federal income 
tax. l.R.C. §§ 136!-I379 (1995). 
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Moreover, the Internal Revenue Service may treat large interest payments as dividends 
and bar a deduction. 126 Many purchasers of convertibles from private companies are 
corporations, which favor preferred stock because they can exclude most dividends, but 
not interest, received for federal income tax purposes. 127 This is not true for the indi-
viduals and other non-corporate investors who purchase most convertibles issued by 
public companies. In sum, convertible debt may be more burdensome to an issuer than 
convertible preferred, while the benefits of debt to the investor may be minor or illu-
sory. 
B. Convertible Preferred vs. Straight Equity 
Why is convertible preferred used instead of straight equity; that is, why 1s 
backdoor equity preferred to front door equity? 
1. Asymmetries of Information and Expectations 
Information asymmetries explain the use of convertible preferred even less than the 
use of convertible debt because preferred provides less protection lha.n debt against 
deceit. Asymmetric expectations are probably also less important here because preferred 
has a lower status, and thus a lower value, than debt in bankruptcy. 
2. Avoidance of Limbo and Mismanagement 
Because preferred stock dividends can be deferred indefmitely, preferred does not 
protect against limbo and assure liquidity as debt does. It does, however, protect inves-
tors better than straight equity. Dividends on common stock are usually prohibited un-
less all dividends due on the preferred are paid. Preferred stock is also senior to com-
mon in liquidation. 128 
These features alone do not fully protect investors, however. Managers can draw 
compensation while paying no dividends on either common or preferred stock. 129 The 
liquidation preference on preferred stock can also induce managers to delay liquidation 
and collect compensation until no assets remain. These problems can be avoided by 
event-of-election clauses that permit the preferred shareholders to seize control of the 
];26. l.R.C. §§ 385, I 001 (1988). 
127. I.R.C. § 243 (1988). 
128. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, FuNDAMENTALS OF MODERN BUSINESS§ 15.4.1 (1989); Holderness & 
Sheehan, supra note 95, at 339 (illustrating where preferred stock is chosen over common to get liquidation 
preference). 
129. See Memorandum from iarnes Schilling, supra note 71 (stating tl1at investors have found it difficult 
to limit compensation by contract). 
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firm if certain fmancial goals are not met130 and by redemption clauses that permit 
them to "put" their stock to the company in defined circumstances. 131 Common stock 
lacks such features. 
3. Opportunistic Dissolution 
A company with few tangible assets could issue common stock and then quickly 
liquidate. All shareholders would share pro rata in the proceeds even though new inves-
tors paid much more for their stock. 132 Even if dissolution stems from honest, unex-
pected disputes, it is unfair for some investors to profit while others suffer loss from the 
conflict. Moreover, dissolution may be triggered by insiders seeking to seize firm assets 
at a bargain price.133 To avoid this, investors often demand a senior security (including 
preferred stock) with a liquidation preference. This reduces,. if not eliminates, the man-
agers' opportunity to profit from a bargain purchase or an inequitable division of assets 
on liquidation. 
Vlll. CONVERTIBLES AND THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE PUZZLE 
Thirty-eight years ago, Modigliani and Miller advanced the "irrelevance hypothe-
sis"-"the average cost of capital to any firm is completely independent of its capital 
structure .... "134 In this view, capital structure is a zero-sum game-the interest of 
each group of security holders comes at the expense of other groups. Scholars have 
tried to disprove this thesis by showing the efficiency implications of capital structure. 
The conclusion here, that convertibles are efficient, undermines the irrelevance hypothe-
sis and improves our understanding of capital structure. 
130. See I HALLORAN ET AL., supra note 99, at 359 (discussing event-of-election clauses). Another ap-
proach requires payment of dividends on the preferred, but permits payment in either cash or stock. Payment 
of dividends in stock increases the preferred shareholders' voting power and can eventually enable them to 
control the board. See Holderness & Sheehan, supra note 95, at 331, 334 (discussing Turner Broadcasting); 
see generally Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, 
59 REv. ECON. STIJD. 473 (1992) on the advantages of contingent control agreements. 
131. See Boom, supra note 87, § 2:15, at 44-45. On the use of puts to limit executive perquisites, see 
Haugen & Senbet, supra note 14, at 634-36. 
132. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 383, at 1152 (3d ed. 
1983) ("[A]ll shareholders upon liquidation participate ratably in the net assets .... "). For example, if an 
investor pays $3 million for half the stock and the proceeds on liquidation are $4 million, the investor re-
ceives only $2 million. The initial shareholders get the other $2 million, even if they paid much less for their 
stock. This scenario is not far-fetched because the liquidation value of most small companies is far less than 
the going concern value on which the price of the investor's stock is calculated. See generally FRANK H. 
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FlSCHEL, THE ECONOMJC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 242 (1991); ROBERT 
C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 786 (1986). 
133: The managers' circumstances may thwart such ploys. On dissolution, firm assets generally are sold 
at auction. See F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 
§§ 5:21-5:22 (2d ed. 1993). Managers often lack the money to bid fair value for the assets. Wealthier outside 
investors could then purchase the assets for a bargain price. However, investors usually cannot run the firm 
themselves. Without the managers' skills, the finn's assets may be worthless to them. Also, managers could 
find other investors to finance a scheme to grab the assets in an auction at a bargain price. 
134. Modigliani & Miller, supra note 1, at 278. 
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Some commentators posit that efficiency is promoted by dividing claims among 
specialists in different ldnds of information. 135 Convertibles, however, combine differ-
ent ldnds of claims. Yet, the use of convertibles does not necessarily contradict the 
specialization thesis. Some uses of convertibles are dominated by specialists like insur-
ance companies. 136 
Most analyses of capital structure, including most work on convertibles, "assume 
shareholder wealth maximization as the corporate objective."137 This assumption ig-
nores the separation of ownership and control: managers control most companies and 
often use control to further their own interests, not the shareholders' interests. 138 Man-
agers often issue convertibles because they serve the managers' own interests better 
than other means of financing. Investors may also prefer convertibles because they limit 
managerial opportunism better thai! other securities. In short, convertibles are often 
Pareto superior to other sources of capital when considering the interests of managers 
and (new) investors. Many convertible financings, however, are not optimal for non-
manager shareholders. The losses outside shareholders incur from these. financings are 
an agency cost. This suggests that future work on all aspects of capital structure should 
concentrate on agency costs and the separation of ownership ai!d control. 
This Article also calls into question efforts to explain capital structure by any sim-
ple formula. Many financial economists advance a "pecldng order" theory: strong firms 
borro\V because of the tax advantages of debt, while wealcer firms issue equity because 
the costs of possible financial distress (i.e., banlcruptcy) from added debt outweigh those 
tax advantages. 139 The uses of convertibles reveal this theory to be hopelessly simplis-
tic; the managers' risk-aversion and consumption preferences must be factored into the 
equation. 
Moreover, although the preferences of individual investors cail generally be disre-
garded when modeling decisions about capital structure, managers' personal preferenc-
es cannot be ignored. 140 Thus, no formula, however complex, can explain capital 
structure decisions if it ignores the personal preferences of the managers of a particular 
firm. The significance of managers' personal preferences cannot be limited to convert-
ible financings. Nor ca.-1 it be limited to the question of ·.vhen a fi .. rm will obtain e;rtemal 
financing and what general form the financing will take. For example, in debt 
financings some managers may agree to a higher interest rate in exchange for more 
lenient covenants that infringe less on their discretion and pose a lesser threat to their 
control. 
135. See D. Bruce Johnsen, A Transaction Cost Theory of Corporate Finance, With Applications to Secu-
rity, Bankruptcy, and the Nature of Economic Organization (May 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
the author). 
136. See Carey et al., supra note 28, at 23. 
137. Shyam-Sunder & Myers, supra note 17, at 4. 
138. This idea was popularized by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 87-90, 124 (1932), but the idea goes back at least to Adam Smith. See ADAM SMITH, AN 
lNQUJRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 700 (E. Cannan ed. 1966). 
139. See Shyam-Sunder & Myers, supra note 17, at 2; Stein, supra note 3, at 3-5. 
14D. For example, managers differ in their attitudes about how hard to work and compensation for that 
work versus other managerial perquisites (or ""staff'). 
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Studies of ¢apital structure must also focus on private companies and private place-
ments by public companies. Unlike public offerings, private placements (even by public 
companies) are individually negotiated with one or a few large institutions that carefully 
investigate the issuer before investing and then monitor the issuer after investing. These 
institutions can easily approve amendments to agreements, but they need special ar-
rangements to achieve liquidity because their investment is not publicly traded. Unlike 
public companies, private firms have managers who are major shareholders and are not 
vulnerable to hostile tender offers or proxy fights. Therefore, major investors often 
negotiate for board seats and even contingent rights to seize control from the managers. 
As a result, private fmancings differ in many ways from the public offerings on which 
financial economists typically focus. If we are to understand the entire field of finance, 
then, we cannot ignore private fmancing or simply assume that it is the same as public 
fmancing. 
Existing work on this subject also argues for closer collaboration between econo-
mists and legal scholars in the field of corporate fmance. Lawyers draft the documents 
that create a capital structure and the law interprets these documents and fixes default 
rules to govern situations not covered by contract. In the last twenty-five years, lawyers, 
judges, and legal scholars have profited from economic analyses of the law in many 
areas, including corporate fmance, but they still have much to learn from fmancial 
economists. Financial economists can also profit from cooperation. They have largely 
ignored non-public compa..nies because t.lJey focus on securities markets, wherein privaie 
companies are not traded. Yet, the vast majority of corporations are non-public, com-
prising a growing segment of the economy. To understand their behavior, economists 
will need the help of lawyers who work closely with these companies. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Financial economists have tried, but failed, to construct a single theory to explain 
the use of convertible securities. The role of convertibles is complex and dependent on 
several factors. The impossibility of a single, comprehensive theory is aesthetically 
disappointing, but appreciation of the more complex reality gives us a better under-
standing of convertibles. Use of convertibles will grow in the future because of their 
flexibility, especially in private placements. This trend will be abetted by the increasing 
share of the economy occupied by private firms, which make greater use of convertibles 
than do public companies. A richer understanding of convertibles helps us as lawyers, 
economists, investment bankers, and industrialists to improve corporate financing, on 
which economic growth depends so heavily. 
